Security of Payment NSW - Know your right to receive progress payments for construction works and related goods and services

14 Dec 2022

As a direct or indirect result of the COVID-19 pandemic and uncertainty in a global economy, various issues have been adversely impacting the construction industry, such as an increase in raw material price and supply chain disruption. Particularly, contractors and subcontractors are struggling with their cash flow due to their outstanding payments for the works carried out.

Accordingly, security of payment legislation in each state has played a role in ensuring that anyone carrying out construction work, and supplying related goods and services under a construction contract gets paid promptly. This article discusses and explains your rights under the NSW Security of Payment Act, and each state has its own security of payment legislation, which may differ from each other in detail.

Know Your Rights

In New South Wales, the relevant security of payment legislation is the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) (“SOPA”).

The significance of the SOPA is that it grants contractors rights to receive progress payment even if there is no formal written contract or even if a contract says that you are only allowed to receive a payment at the end of works, i.e., after the completion of works.

Fundamentally, the SOPA entitles a person or a company, who carried out construction work or supplied construction related goods and services, to receive progress payment. A progress payment means a partial payment for works as the project progresses even if the assigned works are not completed. Therefore, the progress payment facilitates cash flow for contractors and suppliers in the construction industry.

Under SOPA, the following rights are granted to you:

- - A right to receive a progress payment at least on a monthly basis;
  - Maximum time limits to respond to claims for progress payments;
  - Maximum payment terms;
  - A right to suspend work in the event of non-payment;
  - No ‘pay when paid’ clause: No need to wait until a contractor you worked for gets paid by a head contractor or principal; and
  - Interest rates applicable on unpaid progress payment.

Who is entitled to receive a progress payment?

A person or company who, under a construction contract or any other construction arrangement, has undertaken to carry out construction work or supply construction related goods or services in New South Wales is eligible to receive a progress payment under the SOPA.[1]

The “construction work” is broadly defined, including construction, alteration, repair, maintenance or demolition of buildings or structures forming part of land.[2] The “related goods and services” also include various related goods and services such as materials for construction or plant for use in construction work, labour service, design or engineering service.[3]

While the SOPA is drafted to cover contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and service providers as broadly as possible, it should be noted that there are also exceptions such as those engaged in the extraction of oil, natural gas or minerals.

Payment Claims

The procedure for receiving a progress payment is triggered by a person entitled under the SOPA (Claimant) making a Payment Claim in writing to the other person who is responsible to make a payment under a construction contract (Respondent)

In making a Payment Claim, Claimants must ensure that the following requirements are met:[4]

1) The construction work related to the progress payment must be identified;

2) The amount of the progress payment must be indicated;

3) A statement that a Payment Claim is made under this SOPA must be inserted;

4) A Payment Claim must be served on the Respondent within 12 months after the construction work was last carried out; and

5) A Payment Claim is only made one (1) time in a month on and from the last day of each month in which the construction work was carried out.

How to respond to a Payment Claim?

The Respondent is required to respond to the Payment Claim by providing a Payment Schedule to the Claimant within 10 business days after receipt of the Payment Claim. By failing to do so, the amount claimed in the Payment Claim is fixed and Respondents are liable for such amount on the due date.

In issuing a Payment Schedule, Respondents also are required to comply with the following requirements:[5]

1) A Payment Claim related to a Payment Schedule must be identified;

2) The amount of the payment the Respondents propose to make must be indicated; and

3) If applicable, reasons why the amount in the Payment Schedule is less than that in the Payment Claim and reasons for withholding payment must be identified.

Maximum payment terms

One of the most important benefits available under the SOPA is that there are statutory deadlines for a progress payment to be made.[6]

If the Respondents fail to pay the progress payment by the deadline in the diagram below, such amount is deemed due and payable, and interest on the unpaid amount is also payable at the prescribed rate.

Your rights to suspend works

A Claimant also has a right to suspend construction work or supply of related goods and services if a Respondent fails to pay the amount by the due date for payment as described above.[7]

At least two (2) business days prior to the suspension, the Claimant must serve on the Respondent a Notice of Intention to Suspend Work in writing. As the date on which the Notice is given is not counted, the Claimant is eligible to suspend work on and from the fourth day of the Notice. Please see the above diagram.

Once the work is suspended under SOPA, the Claimant is not liable for any loss or damage suffered by the Respondent as a result of such suspension. However, once the whole outstanding amount is paid, the Claimant must resume the work within three (3) business days from the payment date.

Don’t wait until a head contractor gets paid

The SOPA expressly prohibits and invalidates any clause in a construction contract that the payment of money is contingent on a milestone or an event in other contracts including a head contract.[8] A common example of these clauses is that a payment under a subcontract is made upon the payment by a principal under a head contract or upon the practical completion of a head contract. Such clauses are deemed unenforceable under the SOPA, and you have a right to claim the progress payment regardless of the operation of other contracts.

Adjudication

A person eligible under the SOPA also can start an adjudication process for unpaid or disputed progress payments. Adjudication is an informal and independent process which an issue or issues are determined by an independent adjudicator regarding the payment claims. The adjudicator’s determination can be enforced as if it is a judgment rendered in a Court.

However, the Claimant must file an adjudication application in writing by the following deadlines:[9]

Type	Deadline
When: 1) Respondent issues a Payment Schedule, and 2) the amount in a Payment Schedule is less than the amount in a Payment Claim	Within 10 business days after a Payment Schedule is issued
When: 1) Respondent issues a Payment Schedule; and 2) Respondent fails to pay the amount in the Payment Schedule by the due date	Within 20 business days after a Payment Schedule is issued
When 1) Respondent fails to issue a Payment Schedule; 2) Respondent fails to pay the amount in a Payment Claim by the due date; 3) Claimant serves written notice of intention to apply for adjudication of the payment claim on Respondent within 20 business days from the due date; and 4) Respondent has been given an opportunity to provide a Payment Schedule within 5 business days after receiving notice of intention to apply for adjudication of the payment claim	Within 10 business days after the end of the 5 business days for Respondent to provide a Payment Schedule after receiving notice of intention to apply for adjudication of the payment claim

Detailed procedures, requirements for adjudication and enforcing the adjudicator’s determination will be discussed in future articles.

Payment Withholding

A subcontractor who has made an adjudication application for a progress payment is also entitled to request a principal contractor to retain money owed to a head contractor to cover the claimed amount.[10] This is called a ‘payment withholding request’.

Upon receipt of the payment withholding request, the principal must retain the amount of money to which the payment claim relates.[11]

When a successful outcome is given in the adjudication process, a subcontractor is able to recover the withheld money from the principal through the procedures set out in the Contractors Debts Act 1997 (NSW).

How can we assist

If you are involved in construction work in New South Wales, the SOPA entitles you to claim the progress payment and have protections accordingly. However, your rights under SOPA may vary depending on your satisfactory fulfilment of requirements and on whether you took proper actions in a timely manner.

Although the SOPA sets out a statutory regime for prompt payment for construction work, there are still a number of disputes arising from unpaid progress payments in a construction contract, which ends up with unsatisfactory outcomes for unpaid contractors and suppliers.

If you are unsure what rights you have in your construction payment issues, H & H Lawyers will be happy to review your case to check whether it might fall within a case protected under the Security of Payment Act or other relevant laws. We can further assist in finding a way to enforce your rights.

Disclaimer: The contents of this publication are general in nature and do not constitute legal advice. The information may have been obtained from external sources and we do not guarantee the accuracy or currency of the information at the date of publication or in the future. Please obtain legal advice specific to your circumstances before taking any action on matters discussed in this publication.

[1] SOPA ss4 and 8.

[2] SOPA s5

[3] SOPA s5

[4] SOPA s13

[5] SOPA s14

[6] SOPA s11

[7] SOPA s27

[8] SOPA s12

[9] SOPA s17

[10] SOPA s26A

[11] SOPA s26B

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Are you at risk of being penalised for “vague” and “onerous” contractual terms?

Key Takeaway Points: • There has been increasing scrutiny over the use of standard form contracts containing unfair contract terms. • Unfair contract terms are those that (a) cause a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations; (b) are no reasonably necessary to protect a party’s legitimate interests; and (c) would cause detriment to the other party if given effect. • New and increased penalties (which could be up to $50 million) will start applying from 10 November 2023. On 4 April 2023, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), filed a case in the Federal Court against Auto & General Insurance Company Limited (Auto & General) over a contractual term which is alleged to have aided in Auto & General being able to unfairly reject consumer claims. Under the contract in question, customers were required to notify Auto & General “if anything changes about [the customers] home or contents”. ASIC came to the view that the clause: • imposes an obligation on customers to notify Auto & General if ‘anything’ changes about their home or contents, which would have been too onerous, vague and/or impractical; • suggests that Auto & General has a broader right to refuse claims or reduce the amount payable under claims if the customer does not meet the notification obligation, than is available under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984; and • could mislead or confuse the customer as to their true obligations and rights under the contract. Accordingly, ASIC alleges that the contract term is unfair under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act). What are ‘unfair contract terms’? An ‘unfair contract term’ is unenforceable in an Australian court. Whether a term is “unfair” is determined by applying a 3-limbed test set out in the ASIC Act or the Australian Consumer Law (contained in Competition and Consumer Act 2010) (ACL) as follows: 1. The term will cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract; and 2. The term is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term; and 3. The term would cause detriment (whether this be financial or otherwise) to a party if the term was applied or relied on. The ACL specifically protects consumers and small businesses from unfair contract terms contained in ‘standard form contracts’. ‘Standard form contracts’ refer to those where there is an imbalance in parties’ bargaining powers, the contract is based on a template with little scope for negotiations or amendments, and/or are presented on a “take it or leave it” basis. There is a presumption that a contract is a standard form contract, in that the person who prepared the contract has the onus of proving that it is not. Recent amendments to the unfair contract term provisions The Auto & General case follows recent amendments which significantly expand the ambit of the unfair contract terms provisions contained in the ACL and the ASIC Act, both of which demonstrate the government’s focus on enforcement (and in turn the need for businesses to review their legal documentation). A key change is the introduction of civil penalties under the ACL and ASIC Act for breaches of the unfair contract term prohibition, reinforced by significant increases in maximum penalties for breaches under the ACL. These penalties will take effect from 10 November 2023, and addresses the issue of the unfair contract terms provisions having largely been “toothless” until now. A brief summary of the key changes to the law can be seen below: Current Law New Law The unfair contract terms protections apply to a small business contract where one party is a business employing less than 20 persons and the upfront price payable under the contract is under $300,000, or $1 million for contracts lasting more than 12 months. Under the ACL, the unfair contract terms protections will apply to a small business contract where one party is a business employing fewer than 100 persons or has a turnover for the last income year of less than $10,000,000. Under the ASIC Act, the protections will apply to a small business contract if the upfront price payable does not exceed $5,000,000, and one party employs fewer than 100 persons or has a turnover for the last income year of less than $10,000,000. No pecuniary penalties. For corporations, increased penalties up to the greater of: • $50,000,000; • 3 times the value of "reasonably attributable" benefit obtained; or • 30% of the corporation's adjusted turnover during the period it engaged in the conduct. $2,500,000 for individuals. Where a court determines a term in a standard form contract to be unfair, it is automatically void. The court can also make orders for the whole or any part of a contract or collateral arrangement, including that the contract is void. The orders can only be made when a person or class of persons has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage. The court can make orders for: • a whole contract or collateral arrangement, including to void, vary or refuse to enforce the contract, if this is appropriate to prevent loss or damage that is likely to be caused (i.e. there is no need for actual loss or damage). • on the application of the regulator, preventing a term that is the same or substantially similar in effect to a term that has been declared as unfair, from being included in any future standard form small business or consumer contracts; • on the application of the regulator, to prevent or reduce loss or damage which is likely to be caused to any person by a term that is the same or substantially the same in effect to a term that has been declared unfair. How does this affect you and how can we assist? Sarah Court, the Deputy Chair of ASIC, stated that: ‘Contract terms need to be proportionate, transparent and clear, so any obligations are easily understood and able to be realistically adhered to by customers. They must accurately describe the actual rights and responsibilities of the parties under the contract.’ It is not long until the amendments kick in. As such, we strongly recommend that you review your standard form contracts to ensure no issues arise regarding any unfair contract terms. Please contact us if you are unsure whether your contracts are standard form contracts containing unfair contract terms.

Security for costs in the context of the foreign judgment registration in Australia: KR & C Co Ltd v Soon Ok Hwang [2021] NSWSC 551

On 18 May 2021, the Supreme Court of New South Wales in KR & C Co Ltd v Soon Ok Hwang [2021] NSWSC 551 held that a security for costs application brought by a judgment debtor in its Notice of Motion to set aside a foreign judgment registered in Australia is to be dismissed with costs. This case provides a useful authority where there is limited case law dealing with security for costs applications in the context of the foreign judgment registrations in Australia. H & H Lawyers successfully opposed the security for costs application in these proceedings. Background In this case, the plaintiff, a foreign company, was a judgment creditor in a judgment held in the Republic of Korea against the defendant who was a judgment debtor. Based on that judgment, the plaintiff filed a Summons seeking an order for registration of the foreign judgment under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) (FJA). The foreign judgment from Korea was ordered to be registered, and the defendant applied to set it aside. A case concerning an application seeking to set aside a registered foreign judgment will be discussed separately in a further case note. Following the setting aside application, the defendant, by another Notice of Motion, sought security for costs against the plaintiff, which is the subject of this case note. The defendant by seeking the security for costs relied upon the prospects of success on the application to set aside the registration of the Korean judgment. The plaintiff opposed the security for costs on, amongst others, the following bases: 1. While security for costs under r 42.21 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) is limited to applications made by a defendant in the proceeding, r 53.4 is intended to preclude a judgment debtor from making an application for security; 2. There is no reason to believe that the plaintiff would not pay any costs order if ordered; and 3. The defendant’s prospects of success are minimal. The Court dismissed the defendant’s security for costs application by upholding the plaintiff’s 2nd and 3rd arguments above. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning The first question before the Court was the interpretation of UCPR r 53.4. That rule relevantly provides that: “For the purposes of proceedings under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 of the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court may make an order under rule 42.21 otherwise than on the application of the judgment debtor.” In the previous hearing, on a motion for extension of time to apply to set aside the registration of foreign judgment before Campbell J in KR & C Co Ltd v Soon Ok Hwang [2021] NSWSC 164, one of the defendant’s contentions concerning r 53.4 was that it allows the Court to make a security for costs order of its own motion. However, Campbell J, referring to Richie’s commentary, stated to the effect that either the judgment debtor or creditor may make an application for security under r 53.4. The Court in the present proceedings disagreed with Richie’s commentary, and accepted and cited obiter dicta of Adams J in Raffaele Viscardi SRL v Qualify Centre Food Services Pty Limited (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 2055 (“Viscardi”), which stated that: “Though awkwardly drafted, this (being r 53.4) appears to prevent a judgment debtor, though a defendant, from making an application under r 42.21.” Nevertheless, the Court did not determine this issue as it was not necessary for the Court to decide that in the circumstance where the judgment creditor was found to be not impecunious. During the proceedings, it was not contested that the plaintiff is a company registered in Korea, ordinarily resident outside Australia, and has no assets in Australia. Therefore, the threshold required in r 42.2(1)(a) of UCPR was enlivened without difficulty. The plaintiff is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a statutory authority in Korea that has a similar function to that of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). There was no evidence establishing that the plaintiff, despite it being a foreign entity, is impecunious or will be unable to pay any adverse costs if ordered. Further, given the substantial reciprocity of treatment of judgments between Australia and Korea, the defendant can enforce the costs order in Korea, if ordered. As to the prospect of success on the application to set aside the registration of the Korean judgment, the defendant relied on public policy grounds under s 7(2)(a)(ix) of the FJA for reasons that: 1. There was a time interval between the foreign judgment and the registration in Australia; 2. The defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in Korea; and 3. The quantum of the registered judgment is excessive. The Court found that the defendant’s public policy arguments were weak. The detailed arguments and analysis of the above contentions will be discussed in a further case note as that is the gist of the further proceedings, however, in summary, it was resolved that the prospect of success in the defendant’s contentions was modest at best. Implications This case is one of the limited authorities that have decided the security for costs application in the context of foreign judgment registrations in Australia. There are three key takeaways to be learned from this case. Firstly, the mere fact that a party is not an ordinary resident and does not possess assets in Australia does not necessarily mean that that party would be unable to pay the costs. There must be something more than evidence simply showing that a party is a foreign entity, particularly in circumstances where that foreign entity is a government-owned company and where an original court and Australian courts mutually recognise judgments of each other. Secondly, when relying on the prospect of success ground in a security for costs application, a party applying for security is required to prove more than a moderate possibility of success in their arguments. In the present case, the Court found that the prospect in the defendant’s arguments was moderate but did not accept that that was sufficient. Lastly and most importantly, it is a persuasive ground to argue that, while it is obiter dicta in this case and also in the Viscardi case, UCPR r 53.4 operates to preclude a judgment debtor from making an application for security. In New South Wales, the registration of a foreign judgment is determined ex parte (i.e. without the other party’s attendance and notice), and it is always the case that a judgment debtor applies for setting aside after the registration is completed. As such, a judgment creditor is relevantly in the position of a respondent/defendant who needs to respond to a motion brought by a judgment debtor. On that premise, it is unreasonable to view that UCPR r 53.4 is interpreted in a way that a moving party seeking a court order, i.e. a judgment debtor, is also allowed to seek security for costs that may stop a judgment creditor from responding to a judgment debtor’s motion

Considering buying off-the-plan? Purchasers beware.

H & H Lawyers successfully defends a vendor developer against claims brought by the purchaser of an off-the-plan property in the Supreme Court of NSW. While the benefits of buying an off-the-plan property are often highlighted to a purchaser, the decision in Xu v Lindsay Bennelong Developments Pty Limited & Ors [2020] NSWSC 1692 confirmed the importance of having any terms that are “non-negotiable” for the purchaser to be clearly expressed in writing in the contract for sale of land. Facts In this case, the plaintiff was a purchaser of an off-the-plan property. During the handover inspection of the completed property, the purchaser discovered that there was only one car space attached to her property despite the representation being made prior to entering the contract for sale of land that there would be two car spaces. Subsequently, the purchaser brought a claim against the former vendors of the subject property and the substituted vendor, to whom the contract for sale was novated to, after exchange of contracts. Other relevant facts include: 1. prior to purchasing the property, the agent made representations to the purchaser that there would be two car spaces attached to the property; 2. prior to purchasing the property, the purchaser’s solicitor inquired and the former developer confirmed in writing that the property had two car spaces; 3. the front page of the contract of sale of land did not specify how many car spaces were attached to or formed part of the property; 4. the draft floor plan and draft strata plan of the property which were attached to the contract of sale marked that there are two car spaces allocated to the property; 5. there was no other mention of there being two car spaces attached to the property in the special conditions to the contract or anywhere else in the contract; and 6. it was a special condition to the contract for sale that the purchaser acknowledges and agrees that the vender may make alterations, from time to time, and vary the building floor plan or the draft strata plan, as it sees necessary or desirable. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants breached the fundamental term and purposes, or alternatively, an implied term of the contract, by only transferring one car space with the property instead of two car spaces. The plaintiff also claimed that, in doing so, the defendants engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct or false representation under sections 18 and 30(1)(e) of the Australian Consumer Law (“ACL”) and sought specific performance for the defendants to transfer one more car park under sections 237 and 243 of the ACL. The then Chief Judge in Equity, Ward CJ dismissed the plaintiff’s arguments and held that: 1. the contract was for the sale of a unit with a single tandem car space. However transferring two car spaces was neither a fundamental term nor an essential implied term of the contract; and 2. the representations that the plan would include a space for two cars were clearly made. Nonetheless, such representation does not amount to misleading or deceptive conduct in circumstances where the developer had reasonable grounds to make such representation at the time and the plaintiff suffered no loss by relying on the promise. Key takeaways While this case is not to be generally applied to all circumstances in relation to off-the-plan purchases, a purchaser of an off-the-plan property should be mindful of standard special conditions attached to contracts for sale of off-the-plan properties which are designed to allow a vendor developer to make changes (to a degree) to a draft floor plan or draft strata plan. As in this case, even if the court finds that the draft plan which formed part of the contract was varied, such variation may not constitute a breach of a fundamental or essential term of contract. Thus, a purchaser of an off-the-plan property must scrutinise the terms and conditions before entering into the contract for sale. Further, if the purchaser seeks to rely on any representations made by an agent or vendor prior to entering into the contract, such representation should be expressly and unequivocally included in writing in the contract to make sure the vendor makes good on the promise. The purchaser should also be mindful that the contract would generally provide a limited time to seek rescission. A vendor should also consider the litigation risks associated with the sale of off-the-plan properties. Even if the vendor is successful such as in this case, being involved in court proceedings is costly and time-consuming, and may impact its reputation as a developer as well as open the gate for other purchasers to bring a similar claim against the developer. Disclaimer: The contents of this publication are general in nature and do not constitute legal advice. The information may have been obtained from external sources and we do not guarantee the accuracy or currency of the information at the date of publication or in the future. Please obtain legal advice specific to your circumstances before taking any action on matters discussed in this publication.

Freedom of Contract: Can parties contract out a statutory limitation period? The High Court says yes.

One of the basic principles of Australian contract law is freedom of contract: parties are free to enter into an agreement on whatever terms they choose. With that principle, a question always arises as to what extent parties can limit or exclude the operation or effect of statutes. In Price v Spoor [2021] HCA 20, the High Court of Australia concluded that a statutory limitation period under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) can be contracted out by an agreement between parties as it is not contrary to public policy. This case made a clear authority in dealing with the boundary of the freedom of contract to the extent of the statutory limitation period. However, caution should be taken in applying it. Background In 1998, Price as a mortgagor and Spoor as a mortgagee entered into two mortgage agreements, but a loan of $320,000 and interest were not repaid to Spoor when due and payable in July 2000. In 2017, Spoor brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland against Price to recover the principal sum and interest as well as for possession of the land secured under the mortgages. Price by way of defence and counterclaim argued that Spoor was statute-barred from bringing the action pursuant to the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (Limitation Act). In response, Spoor asserted that pursuant to clause 24 of the mortgage agreements, Price agreed not to plea a defence of limitation period. The Limitation Act relevantly provides that an action for breach of contract and that for the recovery of land shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years and 12 years respectively. In the present case, Spoor brought the proceedings around 17 years after the repayment due date under the mortgages. Clause 24 of the two mortgages provides that: "The Mortgagor covenants with the Mortgage[e] that the provisions of all statutes now or hereafter in force whereby or in consequence whereof any o[r] all of the powers rights and remedies of the Mortgagee and the obligations of the Mortgagor hereunder may be curtailed, suspended, postponed, defeated or extinguished shall not apply hereto and are expressly excluded insofar as this can lawfully be done." Then, the main question before the High Court was, among others, whether the parties can effectively agree in a contract that either party would not rely on the statutory limitation defence. In other words, the question is whether parties can ‘contract out’ the statutory limitation period. The High Court’s Decision Earlier High Court cases already dealt with the effect of statutory limitation, discussed in Price v Spoor. In The Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, Gummow and Kirby JJ said that a statutory bar in the case of a statute of limitations does not go to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the claim but rather to the remedy available, and therefore to the defences which may be pleaded. In Westfield Management Ltd v AMP Capital Property Nominees Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 129, it was held that a person can waive or renounce its right conferred by a statute unless it would be contrary to the statute to do so. The High Court further went on to say that a contract will be ineffective or void where it operates to defeat or circumvent a statutory purpose or policy according to which statutory rights are conferred in the public interest. Accordingly, the above can be summarised as the following principles: 1. a limitation period is a right conferred on a party seeking to enforce the defence; and 2. a person is allowed to agree to abandon a statutory right conferred on them if that statute does not prohibit them from doing so or if that is not contrary to public policy. The High Court first found that there is no express prohibition against ‘contracting out’ of a statutory defence in the Limitation Act. Then, it went on to decide that while a statutory purpose of imposing a limitation period in the Limitation Act is to promote the finality in litigation, i.e. speedy resolution of disputes, the right conferred is rather an individual benefit which can be elected to utilise as a defence, and it does not intend to remove jurisdiction of the court even if a limitation period has ended. Further, the High Court found that clause 24 of the mortgage agreements effectively gave up the benefit provided by the Limitation Act, on the grounds that the parties intended that clause 24 has wide operation including provisions in the Limitation Act by making reference to its text, context and purpose as well as to the understanding of a reasonable businessperson. Steward J agreed with Kiefel CJ and Edelman J’s reasons but further emphasised that the inclusion of clause 24 is a legitimate adjustment of the private statutory rights by exercising their freedom of contract and noted an important attribute of contract law stated in Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656: “Exceptions from that freedom of contract require good reason to attract judicial intervention to set aside the bargains upon which parties of full capacity have agreed." Implications It is important to note that the High Court in Price v Spoor clearly rendered the decision that the parties can contract out the statutory limitation defence under the Limitation Act as such conduct is not contrary to the public policy. While bearing in mind this precedent, due regard should also be given to applying this to cases arising in different circumstances. The High Court in reaching its conclusion in Price v Spoor indeed considered the interpretation and the purpose of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) as well as the interpretation of a relevant clause in the contract. Each state in Australia has its own legislation governing statutory limitation period, and the policy reasoning behind each legislation may differ from state to state. Further, whether or not the parties effectively agree to contract out the statutory limitation period is ultimately dependent upon the construction of contract clauses. Therefore, it is worthwhile to note that parties intending to contract out or vary the statutory limitation period in their contract must obtain prior legal advice so as to ensure that such intention is effectively incorporated and enforceable against a breaching party. Finally, it should be noted that a term that purports to waive rights under a statute which serves a public purpose will not be enforceable. For example, an employment contract that purports to waive or renounce employee’s rights such as minimum terms and conditions under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) will be unenforceable. Disclaimer: The contents of this publication are general in nature and do not constitute legal advice. The information may have been obtained from external sources and we do not guarantee the accuracy or currency of the information at the date of publication or in the future. Please obtain legal advice specific to your circumstances before taking any action on matters discussed in this publication.

Debt Recovery

“A person A who resides in Eastwood lent the amount of $8,000 to his friend B. B promised that he would repay $1,000 per month for eight months and at the end of the last month, B would pay interest of $400. However, B has not repaid any money for five months, and ultimately, he started ignoring A’s contact at all. As such, A wishes to bring a court action against B for the debt recovery.” 1. Mediation through Community Justice CentreBefore commencing a legal proceeding, parties are recommended to resolve their issues through mediation service provided by the local Community Justice Centre. Disputes are sometimes resolved and settled in this stage, and these procedures are beneficial to the parties in disputes in order to ascertain each other’s positions. One of the advantages for mediation in the Community Justice Centre is that it does not require any legal assistance by lawyers. Mediation procedures generally take two hours and are free of charge. If A and B execute a settlement document through the mediation and register it to the court, such a document will have legally binding effects. A settlement through mediation procedures is particularly efficient in the sense that parties do not need to spend time and costs for legal proceedings. It is generally known that around 80% of cases are settled in this stage. To get more information, please contact 1800-990-777. 2. Letter of demandIf parties are unable to reach an agreement in mediation, party A may send a letter of demand to party B. That letter may include an amount of debt and a due date, and that A would initiate a court action by submitting a complaint to the court unless B repays the debt by the due date. For instance, A can send the letter stating that “I hereby demand that you repay me $8,400 by 30 April 2018. Otherwise, I will commence legal proceedings against you to recover the debt without any further notice”. It would be good to include in the letter that both legal costs and an interest on the debt would be charged. Although sending a letter alone to B’s address by post is the best way, sending an email or a facsimile together with the letter is even more effective. 3. Court proceedingsIf B doesn’t repay the debt by the due date indicated in the letter of demand, A can initiate a court proceeding in the Small Claims Division of the Local Court given that the amount of debt is less than $10,000. One of the benefits of lodging a claim in the Small Claims Division is that the rules of evidence do not apply, and a trial is conducted faster and simpler than by a judicial panel. Hence, a claimant can be self-represented without appointing a lawyer if he or she has no difficulty speaking in English. If the amount of debt is more than $10,000, a claimant should bring an action in the General Division of the Local Court, and if it is more than $750,000, he or she should bring an action in the Supreme Court. In litigations that are not in the Small Claims Division, it is commonplace for claimants to appoint lawyers in trials due to the complexity of facts and numerous potential sources of disputes. On this occasion, claimants should be noted that a limitation period for a debt recovery is six years from the date of accrual of a debt. If more than six years has already elapsed, a claimant may be unable to bring a court action for a debt recovery against a debtor. 4. Statement of ClaimA has to attest an object of and a reason for a claim in a complaint called the Statement of Claim and submit the document to the Local Court Registry with a filing fee of $99, which begins an official court proceeding. In the Statement of Claim, a claimant can also demand the other administrative fees incurred for a proceeding including a filing fee as well as a legal interest (the average interest rate from January 2018 to June 2018 ranged from 5.50% to 7.50% and can vary before and after a trial). Also, if a lawyer represents a claimant in a court proceeding, A can also demand a legal fee in the Statement of Claim. Once A completes the Statement of Claim and submits both the original copy and two replicated copies (total three copies) to the Local Court Registry, A will be immediately granted a confirmation stamp and a case number. The original copy would be stored at the court, and the other two replicate copies would be returned to A. A has to serve one of the two replicate copies which have the court’s stamps to B within six months thereafter. The most recommended way of a service is either in person or via post by the court. When intending to use the court’s postal service, A can apply for it upon the submission of the Statement of Claim, and the application fee for the service is $42 as of now, the amount which can be also claimed from B by including the amount in the Statement of Claim. 5. Default JudgmentB has to submit a Defence to the court within 28 days of being served with the Statement of Claim. If B fails to do so, A can apply for a Default Judgment. A Default Judgment is when the court unilaterally makes a judgment against a defendant without a hearing, and this judgment concludes with final costs inclusive of an amount of debt, legal costs and interests. When applying for a Default Judgment, A has to submit to the court both an Affidavit of Service which proves that the Statement of Claim is properly served to B either in person or via post by the court and a Notice of Motion-Default Judgment for liquidated claim.